Israeli aircraft never engaged North Korean pilots in combat

CLAIM:

Israeli aircraft never engaged North Korean pilots in combat.

STATUS:

False.

KEY COUNTERPOINTS:

The strongest academic source in hand says the U.S. government announced that Israeli and North Korean air force units had engaged in combat. The ROLES article states that on October 18, 1973, the United States government announced that Israeli and North Korean air force units had engaged in combat, making North Korea’s participation internationally known. That alone kills the “never engaged” claim.
The same source says Shazly’s account described prewar encounters with the Israeli Air Force. The ROLES article says that according to Shazly, North Korean pilots had engaged the Israeli Air Force two or three times before the October War broke out. The article adds that these were probably skirmish-level encounters, but that is still combat contact.
A second Miyamoto study goes even further and says North Korean troops fought Israeli troops in the war. The “Military Cooperation Policy” article states that North Korea dispatched air force units to Egypt and Syria in 1973 and that these North Korean troops fought Israeli troops in the Yom Kippur War.
Israeli-side later reporting also describes clashes rather than mere deployment. A Washington Institute analysis reports that as the Yom Kippur War commenced, Israeli military personnel described clashes with North Korean fighters over the Sinai, and that IAF commander Benjamin Peled said Israeli jets shot down two North Korean-piloted MiGs in dogfights. That is later reporting, not the strongest source in the stack, but it points in the same direction.

EVIDENCE:

• The ROLES article states: “the United States government announced that Israeli and North Korean air force units had engaged in combat.”

• The same article says: “According to Shazly, North Korean pilots had engaged the Israeli Air Force two or three times before the October War broke out,” and adds that North Korean pilots had experience with the Israeli Air Force before the war.

• Miyamoto’s separate article says North Korea dispatched air force units to Egypt and Syria in 1973 and that “these North Korean troops fought Israeli troops in the Yom Kippur War.” It also says North Korean reports claimed the air wing shot down four Israeli F-4 fighter jets in its first battle.

• Bermudez independently confirms the basic setup by stating that Pyongyang sent “a squadron of fighter pilots to Egypt prior to the 1973 War,” which strengthens the plausibility of the engagement evidence even though that source is not the main combat proof.

PRIMARY SOURCES:

• Satoru Miyamoto and Satoshi Ikeuchi, “North Korea and the October War: Relations with Egypt and Syria,” ROLES Review Vol. 5, journal pp. 40-45 and 56-58, parsed PDF pp. 5-10 and 21-23.
ROLES article link

“During the 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel, Kim Il Sung had sent to Egypt a squadron of MiG fighter aircraft with North Korean pilots”

↑↑↑ Best source!

• Satoru Miyamoto, “North Korea’s Military Cooperation Policy Toward Iran and other Middle East Countries,” article pp. 6-7, parsed PDF pp. 6-7.
Military cooperation article link
States that North Korea dispatched air force units to Egypt and Syria in 1973, that those troops fought Israeli troops in the Yom Kippur War, that the Egyptian deployment arrived in early June and was assigned in July, and that the unit consisted of 30 pilots plus controllers, interpreters, commanders, a doctor, and a cook. It also says North Korea continued military support to Middle Eastern states in conflict with Israel after the war.

• Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korean Military Involvement in the Middle East,” Policy Focus 27, p. 13.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus27.pdf
Useful background corroboration for the deployment itself. It confirms that Pyongyang dispatched a squadron of fighter pilots to Egypt prior to the 1973 war.

“Some reports indicate that these pilots flew defensive*
patrols over Syria and suffered casualties at the hands of the Israeli Air Force. 2 2
After the war, North Korea also began to supply conventional weapons to the
Syrian army, consisting primarily of spare parts, ammunition, and artillery
systems like the BM-11 and ZP”

STRONGEST COUNTER ARGUMENTS WORTH KNOWING:

• The exact details of the air combat are less solid than the deployment itself. The public record available here supports engagement, but the most specific combat claims still depend heavily on later research, memoir-based material, and North Korean or later reported accounts rather than a clean declassified Israeli or Egyptian after-action file.

• Claims about shootdowns should be treated cautiously. The “four Israeli F-4s” claim is explicitly attributed to North Korean reports in Miyamoto’s article, so it should not be treated as equally solid as the simpler claim that combat engagement occurred.

• The safest formulation is narrower than some dramatic retellings. It is well supported that Israeli and North Korean air units engaged in combat. It is less well nailed down exactly how many clashes occurred, when each clash happened, and which side’s kill claims were accurate.

NOTES:

This one should be framed carefully.

The strong rebuttal is not “every famous dogfight story is fully proven.”
The strong rebuttal is: the claim that Israeli aircraft never engaged North Korean pilots is contradicted by the sources in hand, which describe actual combat engagement and prewar skirmishes.

The cleanest line is:
Available evidence indicates that Israeli and North Korean air units did engage in combat in the 1973 war context, even if the exact number and outcome of those engagements remain disputed.

Explorer