Palestinians broadly support a two-state solution

CLAIM:

Most Palestinians support a negotiated two-state solution with Israel.

STATUS:

Misleading

KEY COUNTERPOINTS:

Recent PCPSR polling does not show majority support for a two-state solution; in both the latest polls, more Palestinians opposed the concept than supported it. Poll No. 93 found 39 percent supporting and 58 percent opposing. Poll No. 96 found 45 percent supporting and 53 percent opposing. These are results from an independent Palestinian research institution, not an Israeli or Western polling body. Majority opposition in both polling cycles directly falsifies the “broadly support” framing.
Support is highly sensitive to how the question is worded, and falls significantly when concrete concessions are attached. In Poll No. 96, support for a two-state arrangement dropped to 44 percent when the proposal specified a demilitarized Palestinian state with limited land swaps, and fell further to 31 percent when the full package included ending the occupation, creating a demilitarized state, and normalizing relations with Israel and Arab states. The more specific and concrete the proposal, the less support it draws.
Some Palestinians still prefer a two-state framework when choosing among multiple final-status options, but comparative preference is not the same as broad support for a negotiated peace package. Poll No. 93 found that 51 percent preferred a two-state solution based on 1967 borders when respondents were asked to rank end-state options against each other. Preferring one option over worse alternatives in a forced-choice format is a different finding from majority endorsement of the two-state solution as a desired outcome.
Wording matters significantly, and the “two-state solution” label itself suppresses support relative to equivalent concepts described differently. Poll No. 93 found that when the question was reframed from “two-state solution” to support for “an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 territories,” support rose to 59 percent. That gap shows that Palestinian opinion on a Palestinian state is more favorable than opinion on the “two-state solution” as a phrase, likely because the phrase implies mutual recognition and negotiation with Israel.

EVIDENCE:

Poll No. 93 (September 2024): 39 percent supported and 58 percent opposed the general concept of a two-state solution.
Poll No. 96 (October 2025): 45 percent supported and 53 percent opposed the general concept of a two-state solution.
Poll No. 96: support dropped to 44 percent for a proposal specifying a demilitarized Palestinian state with limited land swaps, and to 31 percent for a broader package ending the war, ending the occupation, creating a demilitarized state, and normalizing relations with Israel and Arab states.
Poll No. 93: when respondents chose among multiple final-status options, 51 percent preferred the two-state solution based on 1967 borders. That is a comparative preference finding, not a general-support finding.
Poll No. 93: when the question was framed as support for “an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 territories” rather than using the “two-state solution” label, support rose to 59 percent. That 20-point gap illustrates how significantly label and framing shape the result.

Palestinian Support for Two-State Solution by Framing (PCPSR Poll 96, October 2025)

Palestinian Support for Two-State Solution by Framing (PCPSR Poll 96, October 2025): Support for a two-state arrangement starts at 45 percent for the general concept and falls to 31 percent when full normalization is included, while opposition rises from 53 to 67 percent across the same range. The more concrete and reciprocal the proposal, the harder opposition becomes. This is why citing a single favorable poll number without specifying the exact question asked is misleading.

The three framings do not sum to 100 percent because PCPSR retains a small residual of respondents who answered “don’t know” or gave no opinion. That slice (2 to 7 percent depending on the framing) is not displayed in the chart but accounts for the gap.

PRIMARY SOURCES:

PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (28 October 2025)
https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/1000
Most recent data point. Documents majority opposition to the two-state concept, falling support under specific concession packages, and the 31 percent floor when full normalization is included.

“45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution.” (Poll 96)

“two thirds expressed opposition and only 31% expressed support.” (Poll 96, full normalization package)

↑↑↑ Best source!

PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 93 (3-7 September 2024)
https://pcpsr.org/en/node/991
Documents 58 percent opposition to the general concept, the 51 percent comparative preference for 1967-borders two-state among end-state options, and the 59 percent support figure when the question uses “independent Palestinian state” framing instead of “two-state solution.”

“39% support and 58% oppose the concept of a two-state solution.” (Poll 93)

“51% (49% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders” (Poll 93, among end-state options)

↑↑↑ best source!

STRONGEST COUNTER ARGUMENTS WORTH KNOWING:

Historically, Palestinian support for a two-state solution has been much higher, particularly during active diplomatic periods in the 1990s and early 2000s. Current polling reflects a post-October 7 wartime context, not a permanent settled position.
Some respondents reject the “two-state solution” phrase while still supporting a Palestinian state on 1967 lines under different wording. The 20-point gap between the two framings in Poll No. 93 is real and significant. A flat “Palestinians oppose peace” takeaway would be as inaccurate as “Palestinians broadly support it.”
Poll conditions, information environment, and wartime grievance heavily shape results. Current opposition may reflect anger at the situation rather than a considered rejection of any negotiated two-state arrangement.

NOTES:

The strongest rebuttal formulation is: Palestinian opinion on a two-state solution is divided and highly conditional. The plain concept currently draws more opposition than support, and support falls further as concrete concessions are specified. That is not the same as "broadly supporting a negotiated two-state solution."

Tactical framing: the wording-sensitivity finding is the most useful analytical tool in this note. When the opponent cites a poll showing higher support, ask what exact question was asked. “Independent Palestinian state in the 1967 territories” and “demilitarized Palestinian state with normalization” are not the same question and do not produce the same result. Forcing precision on the question wording often reveals that the opponent is citing a favorable framing rather than the general concept.

The comparative-preference trap is also worth naming explicitly in debate. Saying “51 percent prefer a two-state solution over other options” is not evidence that 51 percent broadly support a negotiated peace deal with Israel. Those are two different measurements. The opponent will sometimes blur this distinction intentionally.

The safe concession: some version of a Palestinian state on 1967 lines draws genuine majority support when framed correctly, and Palestinian opinion on final-status arrangements is more favorable under certain conditions. That does not rescue the “broadly support a negotiated two-state solution” formulation, but it prevents overclaiming in the opposite direction.

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